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Abstract
Agricultural support payments in the EU are increasingly connected to compliance with
environmental standards, through cross-compliance and “Good Farming Practice”-conditions. In
this paper, this relatively new approach is analysed regarding targeting, compatibility with legal
procedures, and effects on income and production. Compliance with standards is reinforced by
more systematic controls and reductions of support payments. As farms are affected by such
sanctions to a different extent, risk-analysis for selection of farms to be controlled is a crucial
element of implementation. The real environmental impacts have to be considered, especially if
indirect control indicators are applied. Furthermore, technical assistance and audits have to be
promoted for the implementation of environmental standards.
Keywords: Good Farming Practice, cross-compliance, environmental standards
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1 Introduction
In the framework of further development of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),
environmental standards for land use and agricultural production are increasingly connected with
agricultural support measures. This linkage can be seen as an integration of environmental
aspects into the CAP and reflects the multifunctional role of agriculture. Since the policy reform
Agenda 2000, both in the market and price policy (1. pillar of the CAP) and in the rural
development measures (2. pillar) new linkages between support and standards have been
established. In the first pillar, this linkage is defined as “cross-compliance”, while in the 2. pillar
requirements are called “minimum standards” or “usual good farming practices” (GFP). With the
Luxembourg reform decisions in June 2003, a more harmonised, obligatory approach for the 1.
pillar will be introduced, including other objectives apart from environmental standards, e. g.
plant and animal health and consumer safety. However, the focus of this paper will be on
environmental standards. Its objective is to present and analyse different approaches of linkages
between support and standards, based on empirical experience from different EU Member States,
and on theoretical considerations. Emphasis is put on the question whether cross-compliance and
similar approaches in the 2. pillar are efficient policy tools, which effects can be expected and
which crucial factors have to be considered in the implementation process. This paper is based
on outcomes of an EU Concerted Action on cross-compliance
1
.
In the following, different types of cross-compliance are defined, and the theoretical
framework of compliance and control is revised. Thereafter, experiences since the CAP reform
Agenda 2000 with the optional cross-compliance approach in different EU Member States are
analysed and compared with procedures of GFP definition and control in the 2. pillar. In a
second step, the new cross-compliance approach of the 2003 CAP reform is analysed, concluding
with an outlook on compliance mechanisms.
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2 Definitions and properties of different approaches of linking support to
compliance with standards
Cross-compliance means to make the reception of public support payments contingent upon
compliance with environmental and other requirements. This term originates from the
agricultural policy of the United States where this approach has been extensively applied since
1986 to enhance soil conservation and the protection of wetlands (Baldock and Mitchell, 1995;
Latacz-Lohmann and Buckwell, 1998; Claassen et al., 2004). Precondition for cross-compliance
is the individual excludability from public support, which in the EU has been enabled through
the conversion of price support into direct transfer payments since 1992. Thus, cross-compliance
depends on the existence of direct payments and their allocation to individual farms (Russel and
Fraser, 1995; Latacz-Lohmann and Buckwell, 1998; Webster and Williams, 2001). Baldock and
Mitchell (1995) distinguish two types of cross-compliance:
•  “Red Ticket” or obligatory approach: Eligibility for agricultural support is made
contingent upon farmer‘s attainment of given conservation standards
•  “Orange Ticket”: Eligibility for agricultural support is made contingent upon
farmer‘s entering an otherwise voluntary incentive scheme with environmental
objectives
The „orange ticket“ can be regarded as a sub-category of the “red ticket” approach and is
suitable especially when farmers are unequally affected by cross-compliance requirements.
Incentive payments can be understood as compensation for additional burden (Christensen and
Rygnestad, 2000), thus increasing the acceptance for this cross-compliance approach. However,
incentive schemes might loose their voluntary character when this approach is applied. As an
example, in the U.S. especially strict cross compliance requirements could be alleviated through
additional support from the Agricultural Conservation Program (Latacz-Lohmann and Buckwell,
1998).
Environmental incentive schemes („green ticket“) such as voluntary agri-environmental
measures are a third option mentioned by Baldock and Mitchell (1995). Support payments are
offered for farmers complying with especially targeted standards beyond the general baseline of
requirements for all farmers. These payments can not be regarded as general agricultural income
support because they compensate for additional cost and income losses due to specific scheme
requirements. Such payments can be the starting point for another form of conditionality:
•  eligibility for support for voluntary schemes can be made contingent upon farmer‘s
compliance with basic standards such as codes of „Good Farming Practice“ (GFP)
Compliance with basic standards can be seen as a general eligibility criteria for voluntary
measures supporting actions beyond this baseline. Therefore, in the EU the term cross-
compliance is used exclusively in connection with income support payments of the 1. pillar of
CAP in spite of some similarities to the “Good Farming Practice”-conditionality in the 2. pillar.
Cross-compliance according to the obligatory approach is an instrument to enforce
compliance with general environmental standards using the reduction of support payments as an
additional sanction. Furthermore, a more systematic administrative control can increase the
number of on-the-spot controls and thus the risk of revelation of breaches. Since most of the
farms in the EU receive direct payments, cross-compliance is expected to improve enforcement
of standards (Dwyer et al., 2000). However, in sectors without direct payments, such as  the
vegetable, vine and fruit sector, cross-compliance will not become binding.
Therefore, a general question is whether attaching new requirements to existing income
support payments is an efficient policy instrument. Since direct payments are allocated according
to agricultural policy objectives and not according to environmental goals, the linkage between3
both policies results in conflicts and a lack of targeting from the point of view of environmental
policies (Webster and Williams, 2001). Farms most depending on direct payments must not
coincide with those farms causing mayor environmental damages and which should be the main
addressees of environmental regulations (Christensen and Rygnestad, 2000; Dwyer et al., 2000;
Webster and Williams, 2001). The cross relations established between different policy sectors
through cross-compliance might cause higher administrative cost, and are weakening the
clearness of the policy system (Isermeyer, 2002).
Theoretically, the receipt of direct payments is voluntary, so that farms renouncing the
receipt could avoid those cross-compliance requirements which go beyond the legal baseline
(Russel und Fraser, 1995). In this case, cross-compliance is only effective in farms in which
direct payments exceed the cost of complying with additional requirements (Christensen and
Rygnestad, 2000; Webster and Williams, 2001). However, because of the high economic
dependency of EU agriculture from direct payments, cross-compliance requirements de-facto
have for most farms similar properties as legal standards (OECD, 2003), and sanctions through
reduction of support payments have the same effect like increased administrative fines. Cross-
compliance requirements based on legal standards are binding for all farms anyway,
independently from the receipt of direct payments, but, in addition to administrative fines,
beneficiaries of support payments might lose eligibility.
The introduction of ambitious requirements beyond legal standards can transform income
support payments into agri-environmental schemes. Such a transition can be observed in the case
of Switzerland, where the agri-environmental scheme “integrated farming” has been converted
into the basic cross-compliance requirement for all support payments (Lehmann, 2001). By the
same time, a “greening of agricultural policy” can provide new legitimacy to income support
regimes, although the more ambitious cross-compliance standards are the lower is the remaining
income effect of these payments.
Because the future of direct payments in the EU is insecure in the long run, cross-
compliance is frequently seen only as transitional instrument at medium term (Christensen and
Rygnestad, 2000; Dwyer et al., 2000). On the other hand, the new legitimacy through cross-
compliance might at least in medium term hamper the reallocation of funds in favour of more
targeted rural development measures, i.e. the transfer of funds of the 1. into the 2. pillar, the so
called modulation.
In contrast to cross-compliance in the 1. pillar of the CAP, the “Good Farming Practice”-
approach introduced into the CAP since the year 2000 means an additional conditionality only
for beneficiaries of agri-environmental schemes and less favoured area allowances. Thus, less
farms are reached, and beneficiaries are predominantly less intensive farms causing on average
less environmental problems (Nitsch and Osterburg, 2004). The income effect especially of agri-
environmental schemes is limited, so that in the future the risk of sanctions through reduction of
payments as well of the 1. pillar can have impacts on the acceptance of these voluntary
measures.
3 Theoretical considerations on sanctions
Administrations can apply two different approaches to improve compliance with environmental
standards, that is deterrence through control and sanctions, or co-operation. Enforcement of legal
standards with cross-compliance is based on command and control approaches. According to
Becker (1968, cited in Bültmann and Wätzold 2002) individuals decide to comply with norms if
benefits of compliance exceed those of non-compliance. Deciding elements for this choice are
the advantage of non-compliance, the probability of detection and sanction of breaches
(depending on control frequency and appropriate control indicators), and the level and effect of
sanctions. This theoretical concept implicates that increased control frequency and higher4
sanctions can improve compliance with norms. Hence cross-compliance leads to increased
sanctions, enforcement is strengthened.
However, an analysis of compliance with agri-environmental law in Denmark has shown
that knowledge and acceptance of norms are crucial for compliance (Winter and May, 2001),
emphasising the importance of social motivation and moral principles of individuals. Cohen
(1998) states that compliance with standards is higher when these norms are perceived as
legitimate and equitable, and Bültmann and Wätzold (2002) found information deficits an
important reason for breaches. This general observation can be substantiated for agriculture
through the fact that many breaches can be observed even in cases where compliance is not
expensive, e. g. documentation of fertiliser applications, or technical revision of field sprayers
(Bergschmidt, 2003). Co-operative elements are therefore important elements of implementation
and enforcement strategies, e. g. technical advice or information why norms are applied.
However, administrative resources for technical advice may getting scarcer when control rates
are increased.
The principles of proportionality and equity are crucial for acceptance of norms and are
therefore the basis for the imposition of administrative fines. Thus, in constitutional states it is
not possible to increase administrative fines only because breaches are difficult to detect or
control is considered to be too expensive. Administrative fines must correspond to the severity
of the breach, the damage caused, and the possible economic benefit of non-compliance, and
should be coherent with fines in other sectors. Because cross-compliance sanctions are applied to
direct payments unequally distributed between farms, the principles of proportionality and equity
are difficult to be fully respected. Furthermore, cross-compliance sanctions are enacted in
addition to administrative fines which themselves are already considered to be “proportional”.
This might lead to severe problems of acceptance and hamper co-operative approaches (Nitsch
and Osterburg, 2004b).
The definition of compliance with basic standards as eligibility criteria for public support
enables the state to withdraw benefits without considering the principles of proportionality and
equity. Nevertheless, the effects of such sanctions are comparable to administrative fines, and
the magnitude of cross-compliance sanctions can easily exceed the limits set for fines because of
proportionality and equity objectives. In conclusion, the legal and moral implications of this
“second” sanction in addition to fines have to be considered.
4 Environmental standards and linkages with instruments of the EU Common
Agricultural Policy
Table 1 shows different definitions of environmental standards and the variety of terms used in
connection with the CAP. In many Member States GFP is a general term used for statutory
requirements based on legislation and not necessarily linked to CAP support. As a voluntary,
advice-oriented concept, GFP can also go beyond this legal baseline. Also in the EU
environmental legislation, GFP is understood as a general legal standard, independent from
support measures.5
Table 1:  Definitions of environmental standards and their legal basis in the EU
EU environmental
legislation and its







Environmental Legislation defining environmental standards
or
Codes of “Good Farming Practice“ (GFP)
Codes of GFP for technical advice
Environmental requirements within the EU Common Agricultural Policy: Agenda 2000
Agenda 2000: Regulation (EC) 1259/1999, Article 3:
“general mandatory environmental requirements”
Agenda 2000: Regulation (EC) 1259/1999, Article 3: “specific environmental requirements
constituting a condition for direct payments” (cross-compliance, optional for Member States (MS))
Agenda 2000: Regulation (EC) 1257/1999, Chapter V, VI: Less favoured area allowance and agri-
environmental measures: “usual good farming practices”
Agenda 2000: Regulation (EC) 1257/1999, Chapter I, II, VII:
(investment, young farmers, processing and marketing):
“minimum standards regarding the environment”
Luxembourg CAP reform decisions: Cross-compliance according to Reg. (EC) 1782/2003
Annex III: “statutory
management requirements –
environment” (obligatory for MS)
“Good agricultural and
environmental conditions”
partially covered already by





Source: Bergschmidt et al, 2003.
In the framework of the CAP, there exist different definitions for environmental standards.
The optional cross-compliance of the Agenda 2000 reform allows the EU Member States to
define specific environmental requirements beyond legislation, while the option “general
mandatory environmental requirements” is exclusively based on legislation. Within the Rural
Development Regulation (EC) 1257/1999, the concept of GFP for less favoured areas (LFA)
support and agri-environmental measures can include both statutory requirements and standards
beyond legislation. Notably, GFP according to the EU definitions for agricultural policy is
exclusively attributed to standards for these two support measures of the 2. pillar. Minimum
standards regarding the environment for other RDR measures are normally based on statutory
requirements. The implementation of GFP and minimum standards is obligatory for the Member
States since Agenda 2000.
The obligatory cross-compliance within the reform package decided in Luxembourg in June
2003 refers to EU legislation and its implementation on Member State or regional level (Annex
III of Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003). Furthermore, good agricultural and environmental
conditions pursuant to Annex IV of this regulation have to be defined regarding requirements
beyond EU legislation. Partially, these requirements may be already laid down in the existing
national or regional legislation.6
5 Experiences since implementation of Agenda 2000
5.1 Cross-compliance as an optional element of Agenda 2000
With the reform decisions of Berlin in the year 1999, cross-compliance has been introduced
as an optional instrument for the Member States. Regulation (EC) No. 1259/99 enables Member
States to define “specific environmental requirements constituting a condition for direct
payments”, based on direct payments of the 1. pillar, which can be considered as a “red ticket”
approach. 10 out of 15 EU Member States made use of this option (Petersen und Shaw, 2000;
Bergschmidt et al., 2003). In many cases, requirements were defined in order to solve
enforcement problems of existing legislation, e. g. the registration of irrigation water use in
France. In other countries, standards beyond legislation were defined in order to tackle specific
environmental problems, e. g. control of overgrazing in UK, or limited pesticide use in maize in
The Netherlands. In Ireland, an „orange ticket“ approach has been applied since 2003. Farmers
receiving sheep premium must reduce livestock according to regional ceilings and participate in
an agri-environmental farm management scheme (Rath, 2003). After limited results of voluntary
programmes, these cross-compliance measures were quite effective.
Other Member States defined a broader bundle of standards, but implementation and
enforcement of these standards has been scarcely documented. In most cases, Member States
defined cross-compliance conditions for specific direct payments, e. g. control of overgrazing for
the beef and sheep premium. In Denmark, one of the most ambitious approaches has been
implemented, but was abandoned for political reasons by April 2002, after severe acceptance
problems with direct payment reductions of up to 100 %. Table 2 gives a schematic overview on
the different national implementation strategies. It has to be considered that no harmonised EU-
wide mechanisms for control and sanctions have been implemented. In consequence, maximum
payment reductions varied between 10 and 100 % in the different Member States.
Tabelle 2:  Implementation of cross-compliance in Member States of EU-15 in 2003










Legal standards France [Denmark, abandoned in 2002]
few, specific requirements bundle of requirements
No Cross Compliance Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden
Source: Petersen und Shaw, 2000; Bergschmidt et al, 2003.
Obviously, the high variance of implementation in the Member States underachieved the
expectations of the EU commission, so that in 2003 cross-compliance became an obligatory
element of the new agricultural policy reform.
5.2 Standards of “Good Farming Practice” for rural development measures
In the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy the expression GFP refers only, in
contrast to the usage in many Member States, to environmental standards as pre-requisite for
agri-environmental payments and less-favoured areas allowances according to
Regulation (EC) 1257/1999. A comparison of GFP definitions between Member States shows
different strategies in selecting verifiable standards, the thematic focus and the amount of
sanctions. Control is frequently carried out using few and indirect indicators (e. g. fertiliser7
planning, technical revision of field sprayers), mainly in the field of fertiliser and pesticide use.
As the importance of agri-environmental measures and less-favoured areas allowances differs
between Member States, regions and farm types, control frequency varies substantially.
Considering that the EU Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) prescribes a
control rate of at least 5 % of all beneficiaries, and the controlled farms are predominantly
extensive and situated in less favoured areas, the efficiency of such administrative control is
questionable (Nitsch and Osterburg, 2004a). GFP and cross-compliance standards remained
largely unconnected, hence they are considered as different concepts based on different
regulations. However, it will be increasingly difficult to explain this diversity of different
standards to farmers.
6 Cross-compliance as an element of the CAP reform 2003
The 2003 CAP reform has become necessary since the previous reform Agenda 2000 was not far-
reaching enough to tackle problems arising from of EU enlargement and the world trade
negotiations of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Core element of the reform is the
decoupling of direct payments from production. Because of decoupling, direct payments can be
regarded as “green box” measures exempted from support reductions according to WTO
requirements. Thus, there is no need to give new legitimacy to this support before WTO through
the introduction of cross-compliance. The attachment of requirements of public concern to the
direct payments aims at a better public acceptance of this agricultural support policy within the
EU. The decoupled direct payments will be bound to agricultural area, and depend on
compliance with statutory management requirements based on EU legislation in the field of the
environment, food safety, plant and animal health, and animal welfare, specified in annex III of
Regulation (EC) 1782/2003, according to their implementation in the Member States. The way to
implement EU legislation differs in a wide range between Member States, because only few
concrete restrictions for the farm level are defined EU-wide. Therefore, the limit between EU
standards and additional national requirements is in many cases not quite clear.
According to annex IV of the regulation, agricultural land has to be maintained in “good
agricultural and environmental condition”. Requirements for soil protection (erosion, organic
matter, structure), the maintenance of landscape elements as well as a minimum level of land
maintenance have to be defined by the Member States. Furthermore, Member States have to
ensure that the ratio between arable and grassland does not decrease more than 10 % to the
detriment of grassland at regional level, compared to the year 2003. For this, restrictions on farm
level can be applied. Additional cross-compliance requirements in other areas, e. g. for irrigation
water, can not be applied under the new regulation, thus several existing approaches in several
Member States will expire.
In contrast to the former cross-compliance, the new approach has to be implemented by all
Member States in a harmonised way. Cross-compliance refers always to the whole farm
receiving direct payments, and to the total of 1. pillar direct payments. The minimum control rate
is fixed at 1 % of all direct payment recipients. In Germany, and probably also in other Member
States, this will lead on average to more systematic controls. Sanctions for intentional non-
compliance shall be in general 20 % payment reduction and may vary between 15 and 100 %
(Regulation (EC) 796/2004). Regarding requirements of annex III the commission gets a more
direct control on enforcement of EU legislation in the Member States. As cross-compliance
forms a direct connection between farm payments and implementation of EU legislation,
insufficient enforcement can result in disallowance of EU funding. This enables immediate and
direct sanctions of the EU against Member States. However, incomplete implementation of EU
legislation will remain subject of comparatively long-lasting infringement procedures before the
European Court of Justice. In Table 3 objectives and differences between the two sections of
cross-compliance are depicted.8
Table 3: Focus of the requirements according to annex III and IV
Annex III: „Statutory
management requirements“
Annex IV: „Good agricultural
and environmental conditions“
Objective Instrument for the enforcement of
existing legal standards based on EU
legislation
Ensure a minimum level of land
maintenance, especially for non-
cultivated land; avoid the deterioration




Improved compliance due to more
systematic control, harmonised control
rates and higher sanctions
Introduction of new standards until now
not regulated by the EU; these standards
can restrict the scope for voluntary agri-
environmental schemes
Income effect No additional reduction of income
effects of direct payments, because legal
standards have to be respected anyway,
but higher risk of sanctions for farmers
Additional standards can diminish
income effects of direct payments
Possible problems Intensive administrative co-operation
between different special agencies
necessary; no clear limit between „EU
requirements“ (relevant for cross-
compliance) and additional standards of
Member States
Land without direct payments and not
registered in the base period is not
reached which might hamper grassland
protection and management of marginal
land
6.1 Effects of decoupling
The decoupled payment entitlements allocated to farms in the year 2005 will be tradable
within defined regions and can be activated on any eligible agricultural land. The two main
possibilities of introducing the decoupled, payments, which shall be based on a historic reference
situation, are the single farm payment (Regulation (EC) 1782/2003, Art. 33ff.) and flat rate area
payments (Art. 58ff.). These forms of implementing the decoupled payments have not only
different distributional effects between farms and regions, but also impacts on the area
controlled through cross compliance.
If the single farm payment is introduced, which will be the case in about 8 Member States of
EU15, there is an incentive for farmers to exclude – if possible – area from the base area for
which they will receive payment entitlements. This is because the single farm payment is fixed
according to an individual historic baseline. A significant share of grassland is not included in
the IACS statistics, at least in Germany, since it was not relevant for the receipt of payments, so
that exclusion of grassland would be possible. Concentration of entitlements on less area leads to
higher payment entitlements per hectare and to a higher independence from land owners, because
less land is needed to activate the payment entitlements. As a result, more land remains without
payment entitlements. In addition, when implementing the single farm payment certain crops
(sugar beets) receive no payment entitlements , but are eligible for payments. Also land users
without direct payments in the reference period will not receive payment entitlements , but have
eligible land, e.g. horse owners with grassland. Thus, eligible land for activation of payment
entitlements  will possibly exceed the number of hectare-based payment entitlements  to a
significant extent.
In case that regional flat rate payments are introduced, farmers get a strong incentive to
increase their eligible land, as for each additional hectare they will receive an additional area
based payment entitlement . Thus, only few area will remain without payment entitlements , but
payments per hectare are “diluted” because more land is included into the system. Nevertheless,9
also in this approach agricultural land “discovered” after the start of the decoupled system in the
year 2005 will not get payment entitlements .
Decoupling of support from production can lead to abandonment of productive land use in
less favoured areas. Therefore, minimum requirements for land management were introduced.
Through trading, payment entitlements  can be transferred to more favourable areas which are
kept in agricultural use anyway or which can be maintained more easily with machinery. In the
single farm payment system, more land without payment entitlements  will fuel the trade with
premium titles. Especially grassland with difficult management conditions, e. g. on slopes or in
wetlands, will be in danger to lose payment entitlements , which would lead to the situation that
cross compliance will not be binding on such land, if it doesn’t belong to a farmer who receives
direct payments. Marginal lands often offer high value for biodiversity but maintenance of those
areas could become more difficult in future.
Positive income effects of the payment entitlements  will benefit the first recipients of these
rights in 2005 or land owners in accordance to relative scarcity (Isermeyer, 2003). Farms with a
high share of rented land or expanding farms which do not own sufficient payment entitlements
realise less income from support payments as premium rents are transferred to owners of land
and payment entitlements . Thus, such farms are much more affected by cross-compliance
sanctions, as sanctions are based on the full amount of the received payments.
6.2 Cross-compliance based on EU legislation
In this sections, aspects concerning the enforcement of EU legislation according to annex III
of Regulation (EC) 1782/2003 are discussed.
6.2.1 Comparison of administrative fines and payment reductions
After introduction of cross-compliance farms can be sanctioned in three different ways for
non-compliance with relevant legal standards: administrative fines, cross-compliances payment
reductions in the 1. pillar, and sanctions for non-compliance of GFP standards in the 2. pillar. As
an example, administrative fines in Germany reach a maximum of 15,000 € in the area of
fertilising and 50,000 € for pesticide use. In practice, fines remain far below these maximum
values and amounted up to 4,500 € for exceeding the ceiling of organic manure applied per
hectare, or 550 € for the absence of soil analyses (Bergschmidt, 2003).
According to the respective German law (Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten (OwiG)),
administrative fines are only applied in case of intentional infringements. The equivalent cross-
compliance sanction would be at least the minimum payment reduction of 15 % in case of
intention. Assuming an area payment of about 300 €/ha, payment reduction would amount to
45 €/ha. Payment reductions equivalent to maximum fines are reached for breaches of organic
manure ceilings in farms with more than 100 ha, and fines regarding soil analyses even exceed
administrative fines in farms above 12 ha. In this case, in about 60 % of all farms and on 90 % of
utilised agricultural land cross-compliance sanctions would exceed 100 % of the maximum
administrative fine, and this sanction would be applied in addition to legal, “proportional” fines.
This means that in many cases the amount of sanctions is at least doubled through cross-
compliance and, if payment reductions of 100 % are applied. This can put into question the
existence of the respective farm (Nitsch and Osterburg, 2004b).
Although cross-compliance sanctions shall depend on severity, extent, permanence and
repetition of infringements, the minimum sanction of 15 % for intentional breaches can lead to
disproportional sanctions. In case non-compliance is detected in an unimportant branch of a
farm, or on a small proportion of farm area, the sanction nevertheless is applied on the basis of
all direct payments. The existing implementation rules make it difficult to consider the principles
of proportionality and equity. Controls of GFP in the 2. pillar which must be carried out at a rate10
of 5 % can increase the risk of revelation of infringements, thus affecting the acceptance of
voluntary 2. pillar measures (Nitsch and Osterburg, 2004a).
6.2.2 Ecological targeting
The preciseness of targeting cross-compliance towards environmental problems depends on
the definition of control indicators, selection of farms to be controlled, and on the relative
importance of direct payments in the different farms. Farm data of 16,000 farms of the years
1999/2000 and 2000/2001 have been analysed focussing on nitrogen surplus as one main
environmental problem of agriculture in Germany (Nitsch and Osterburg, 2004b). As the EU
Nitrates Directive was included into the set of relevant EU standards, this problem will be
tackled through cross-compliance. In the following, the connection between the importance of
direct payments and nitrogen surplus is analysed. Figure 1 shows regional flat rate payments of
about 300 €/ha as percentage of farm income for farm groups stratified according to organic
nitrogen from animal manure per hectare. On the right hand side Y axis the relation between
direct payments in €/kg nitrogen surplus is illustrated. This is an indicator for possible cross-
compliance sanctions related to nitrogen surplus.
Figure 1: Direct regional area payments as percentage of farm income and
payments in Euro per kilogram nitrogen surplus in farms with
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In general, direct payments are so important that cross-compliance will be substantial for
farm income in all of the analysed farm groups. However, importance of direct payments is much
lower in farms with high livestock densities. Thus, the environmental problem addressed is not
correlated with the importance of direct payments. Possible sanctions per kilogram nitrogen
surplus are highest in farms with low livestock density. Although these farms cause less
environmental problems, they could breach requirements, e. g. book keeping, used as indirect
indicators for cross-compliance. As the experiences since Agenda 2000 show, indirect indicators11
will probably be preferred in order to reduce administrative cost of cross-compliance control.
Such indirect indicators can lead to sanctions which are not really reflecting the severity of
environmental impacts. In this example, cross-compliance obviously is poorly targeted towards
environmental problems. This shortcoming could be addressed through more targeted risk
assessment of farms to be controlled. Furthermore, especially when applying indirect indicators
for cross-compliance control the setting of appropriate, proportional sanctions is crucial.
6.3 Cross-compliance beyond EU legislation (Annex IV)
In the following, selected aspects concerning the enforcement of standards according to
annex IV of Regulation (EC) 1782/2003 are discussed. These standards are beyond existing EU
legislation.
6.3.1 Conflicts with existing agri-environmental schemes
Environmental standards beyond legislation can be in general enforced through
disincentives such as cross-compliance or supported through incentive schemes like agri-
environmental schemes. The normative decision how far cross-compliance should regulate
standards beyond legislation is crucial for voluntary agri-environmental schemes which could
loose legitimacy when requirements become de-facto obligatory in almost all farms through
cross-compliance. Annex IV contains many aspects which could lead to conflicts with voluntary
schemes when an ambitious implementation is intended. Through introduction of payments for
grassland in conjunction with minimum maintenance requirements, basic agri-environmental
grassland support schemes might loose legitimacy, and ambitious definitions of soil conservation
standards could put into question the support of cop rotation, cover crops and conservation
tillage (Osterburg et al., 2003). Against this background, in Germany it is a declared political
goal not to affect existing agri-environmental measures (Nitsch and Osterburg, 2004b). However,
cross-compliance standards intentionally kept at a low level will lead to high administrative cost
without major environmental benefits, and only formally will comply with EU requirements.
6.3.2 Standards for land management
Low management requirements for non-cultivated land may result in large-scale mechanic
land management in less favoured regions, e. g. mulching. This form of land use will compete
with extensive arable farming and grassland based extensive livestock keeping. If requirements
for management of non-cultivated land are increased, as it is discussed e. g. in Germany,
productive land use gets more attractive, because a higher share of the decoupled direct payment
would be lost on non-cultivated land due to higher cost of management. Thus, high management
requirements can result in a significant “re-coupling” of the decoupled direct payments. Trade
relevant supply effects might occur especially when a high share of total agricultural land is
marginal. On this land, ambitious, costly management requirements can lead to higher
production. Less requiring standards for land maintenance enforce decoupling, as non-productive
land management offers a low-cost option for activating payment entitlements . This is true e. g.
for Denmark, where areas which have been set-aside or abandoned must be mowed at least every
fifth year. In Germany, at least yearly mulching is required.
In Denmark, maintenance of permanent grassland and uncultivated areas as open areas with
no establishment of trees and scrubs has been introduced in the Danish Agricultural legislation
in 2004 as a general rule applying independent from cross-compliance. Farmers can avoid the
legal and cross-compliance maintenance standards if they notify their uncultivated areas as
‘nature areas’. Additionally the rules do not apply for permanent grasslands which are placed on
‘very steep’ and ‘very wet’ locations were it is not possible to use a machines. However
permanent grasslands protected under the Danish Nature Protection Act can not be notified as
‘nature areas’ implying the maintenance demand always will apply for these areas. Thus, farmers
will be affected by maintenance requirements to a very different extent.12
A particular problem arises from the fact that cross-compliance is binding for the whole
farm area, i. e. also for land without premium entitlements. Farmers receiving direct payments
are obliged to maintain all their land in good condition. Voluntary schemes can in principal not
be applied in order to support this kind of basic land management because maintenance even of
land without payment entitlements is de-facto obligatory for all recipients of direct payments.
Without exemptions, management of land without payment entitlements through farmers could
get more difficult in future.
6.3.3 Maintenance of grassland
Decoupled payment entitlements can be activated on any eligible land. This could put into
question the existing relation between arable and grassland in the EU, which has been stabilised
through the old arable support regime. Under this regime arable support payments were excluded
for grassland. Therefore, grassland shall be maintained through a special cross-compliance
requirement, although this might mean a coupling of payments to grassland based livestock
production. The implementation regulation Reg. (EC) 796/2004 provides two requirements for
the grassland area. In the first step, Member States are obliged to maintain grassland at the ratio
to arable land of the year 2003. If the ration between arable and grassland decreases more than
10 %, in a second step measures have to be applied in order to restrict grassland conversion at
the farm level. Replacement of ploughed grassland through seeding of new grassland is allowed,
so that no site specific maintenance of grassland is possible. This regulation gives a strong
incentive to “plough first” before the regional minimum level is reached and farm individual
restrictions are applied. In spite of the new cross-compliance requirements, the protection of
particular, ecologically valuable grassland sites will remain subject to specific national or
regional environmental regulations or agri-environmental schemes.
7 Conclusions
The linkage between agricultural support of the CAP and environmental standards provides new
control procedures and punishments in case of non-compliance. Sanctions in the framework of
cross-compliance or GFP control and enforcement procedures will be additional to other fines
and in case of cross-compliance probably much higher than usual administrative fines. Regarding
their economic effect on behaviour of farmers they can be understood as surrogate fines. Their
amount depends not only on severity of the breach and/or compliance cost but as well on the
height of the direct payments. Therefore, there remain doubts about their targeted orientation and
effectiveness as environmental problems addressed by cross-compliance often do not correlate
with the importance of direct payments. Considering the unequal importance of direct payments
in different groups of farms and widespread use of indirect indicators it can be questioned how
targeted cross-compliance will be. For example, farms with very low livestock density depend
more on direct payments, and expanding farms and young farmers, whose income effect of direct
payments is lower, might be affected more by potential sanctions. Participants of agri-
environmental measures or beneficiaries of less favoured area support are controlled above
average (5 instead of 1%) and thus will have a higher risk of punishment not only for 2. pillar
support but as well for 1. pillar payments, while many intensive farms are excluded from the 2.
pillar “high control rate” procedures. This means a completely new situation for farmers
participating in voluntary measures and might affect the acceptance of voluntary agri-
environmental measures. However, from an environmental policy perspective the increased risk
of punishment is seen as a key element for better enforcement of environmental standards in
agriculture.
Compared to cross-compliance in the 1. pillar implemented in different Member States
before the 2003 reform, the new obligatory approach is much broader. GfP in the context of the
2. pillar as well as the new requirements for cross-compliance, that are now to be harmonised for
all Member States, constitute sets of minimum standards for agriculture, but they are as yet13
unconnected. Both codes are influencing the design of agri-environmental measures. Together
with the fact that Member States themselves are controlled by the EU, this can be an incentive of
keeping the baseline, defined by these standards, at a low level.
Inefficient parallel control structures for cross-compliance and GFP can result in
misallocations of scarce administrative capacities. Cross-compliance will be a more general
approach compared to the verifiable standards of GFP. In this context, the existing GFP controls
in the 2. pillar have to be critically revised. As not to risk voluntary agri-environmental measures
defined above an obligatory baseline and in order to minimise control costs there is an incentive
for the EU Member States and regions to define low standards and simplified indicators for
control, which might have little regulatory impact. Indirect indicators may lead to less targeted
procedures and disproportional, imbalanced cross-compliance punishments. Disproportional
sanctions could affect acceptance of cross-compliance and can have detrimental effects on co-
operative approaches in the field of agri-environmental policy. Furthermore, high cross-
compliance sanctions might make politicians reluctant to further develop environmental
standards.
Due to the high dependence from direct payments, cross-compliance requirements beyond
existing legislation constitute de-facto obligatory requirements for agriculture in the EU. When
direct payments is reduced in future, cross-compliance will loose importance, too. Cross-
compliance will be used as a new justification for area based direct payments and thus might
help to stabilise such support. However, the direct payments can not be understood as equivalent
compensation for additional standards as amounts of payments per hectare as well as cost of
compliance differ within a wide range throughout the EU.
In the long run, cross-compliance can not substitute effective environmental legislation and
its enforcement as well as agri-environmental schemes. If politicians and administrations want
cross-compliance having an environmental impact and being more than an additional set of
standards to be administrated and controlled, it should be made sure that those farms are targeted
which are most likely to cause environmental problems. As the farm data analysis has shown,
some counter-balancing is needed:
–  When selecting farms for control, risk assessment according to the potential environmental
impact is crucial rather than considering the amount of direct payments per farm.
–  Sanctions must consider the actual environmental impact, especially when indirect
indicators are used. A standardised implementation of payment reductions based on percent
rates could lead to imbalances and loss of target orientation.
Compliance with standards is not only a matter of control and sanctions but of awareness of
the requirements. Therefore, the importance of information and advise has to be kept in mind.
New approaches should focus on co-operative elements in implementation of environmental
standards, which can include providing basic information, obligatory technical assistance after a
first breach instead of monetary sanctions, and incentives for self-reporting and farm audits. The
new measures in the 2. pillar, in particular the farm advisory service, provide opportunities to
cope with this challenge.14
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